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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 8, 1982 Conference
Summer List 1, Sheet 2
No. 82-52- (f X
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMM., et
al. (employer)

'7

Cert to CA9 (Goodwin, Poole; Nielsen,
dissenting)

v.
NORRIS, et al. (employees)
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely (w/ ext'n)

A voluntary deferred compensation plan allowed retiring

employees to choose between three forms of payments, including an
annuity bought by petrs from independent insurance companies who use
J

sex-based actuarial tables.

The question is whether the employer has

violated Title VII by offering this option.
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FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:
facts.

This case was decided on stipulated

Petr allows employees to enroll in a State Deferred

Compensation Plan.

The Plan, which is voluntary, works in two phases.

During the "accumulation phase," employees may contribute as much of
their pay check as they wish to one of a large variety of investment
options.

The employees pay no tax on the money put into the Plan and

pay no tax on the money earned by the investment until it is
distributed.

This portion of the plan treats both sexes equally and

is not under attack.

Upon retirement, employees enter the "pay-out"

phase of the Plan and must choose one of three options for the
repayment of their deferred compensation.

They may (1) have it

returned in a lump sum (which they can then use, for instance, to buy
the best annuity they can find), (2) receive a specific sum each month
for a fixed number of months, or (3) receive a life annuity which
petrs buy from an independent insurance company.

The insurance

companies providing option {3) 1 use sex-based mortality tables showing
that women as a class live to receive more annuity checks than men as
a class receive.

j

As a consequence, men receive higher monthly annuity

payments than women recieve.

From the point of view of tax deferral,

!however, option {3) is the best for both sexes.
Claiming that option {3) violates the Fourteenth Amendment and,
under the reasoning of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435

u.s.

702 {1978), Title VII, resp brought an action on

1
There is some confusion in the record on this point. Petrs
claim that the parties have stipulated that there are no
insurance companies in Arizona who offer annuities based on
unisex tables. Resp claims that it~ly ;st1pulated~hat all
companies designated as funding media by petr, Ariz. Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, use sex-based
tables.

hchalf of
~njofn

hcroclf

pctro Ctom

and

other

offering

wom~n

cncollcrl in

a n"x d-bns~d

the

Plan,

annuity, and

seeking

to

require

to
pctrn

to augment the annuity checks of those retired women who chose option
(3).

The oc (Cordova) certified the class, rejPcted petrs' arguments

that Title

VII

is not violated by a voluntary plan or by a plan

containing nondiscriminatory options, and gr.antcd injunctive relief.
In addition, the DC directed that retired female employees be paid
tt., J~.. "'" r
~qual annui.ty payments to ~men who accumulated the same deferred
incomc.

The Fourteenth Amendment claim was rejected, however, on the

ground that reap failed to prove purposeful discrimination.
on appeal, petrs challenged both the finding of a Title VII
violation and the relief ordered.

On the violation point, petrs

reiterated the defenses asserted below, and additionally argued that
the DC's decision unduly interfered with the state's right to regulate
the insurance

business~

that Title VII requires proof of intent, which

is lacking since petrs did not themselves create the sex-based annuity
scheme; that Manhart is limited to self-insured employers; that petrs'
Plan falls within the "open market" exception to Manhart ("Nothing in
our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each
/retiree purchase the largest benefi.t which his or her accumulated
contributions could command in the open market," 435

u.s.

at 717-18);

and that petrs are not responsible for the discrimination in the Plan
1

because the options merely
affirmed.

~fleet

On the regulatory issue,

the limits in the marketplace. l cA9

the~~

reasoned that since the

decision below dealt only with the ability of the employer to offer
its employees discriminatory fringe benefits, it did not unduly
interfere with the insurance business.

It found that resp showed as

much intent as Manhart required, that the existence of an option

-

within the •onDn
r--

oarke~·
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excep•-1"on
_

·~.~.~
~ ..,

not cure the Title V!I violation since

•he
-

adopting any

vo-...:.:-.t.a::y n.a -_u re ~ · c·
are entit:ec to t.he s~e

..n • s

w~en

!benefit options as cen; anc tnat Title VII

.
employer' affirrnatively

.Pl~

c~

aga:nst a.;:

protec~s

discri~inatory

is the only one available in the :carketplace.

scbe~e,

even

i~

i~

Most. sign:::cant:y, in

reliance on language in Manhart saying tha·t •an e!:!p:oye:: ::a:: ::1ot}
avoid his responsibilities

by

delegating discriminatory

corporate shells,• 435 U.S. at 718 n.33, CA9 held that

?=os=~~s

to

Jo'..an'ha::t is ;not

limited to employer-operated pension schemes, but rather app:ies eve:-.
when an employer buys annuities from independent companies.
Petrs' challenges to the award were also rejected.
in CAl and DC's in NY, Cal, Mich, and Or. ordering

Noting cases

pa~~ents

by

•passive abusers," CA9 held that the order directing payment to
retired employees was not an abuse of discretion.

It rejected a Tenth

Amendment challenge on the ground that Title VII was enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus giving Congress the power to intrude on the
functioning of the states.
CONTENTIONS:

Petrs claim that this decision extends Manhart to

ban use of sex-based mortality tables by independent insurance company
despite clear language in that opinion stating that Title VII was not
"intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries,"

u.s.

435

at 717 and swallows the "open market" exception carved out in

Manhart since it prohibits the employer from going to the open market
to buy for the employee the best option available.

The decision

ignores the fact that the Plan was voluntary and that the employer has
no control over the insurance industry's methods of operations.
dealt incorrectly with the issue of intent.

1

CA9

Furthermore, the relief

granted violates the Tenth Amendment under National League of Cities

'v.

Usery, 426

u.s.

833 (1973).
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Resp argues that the case involves a staightforward application
of Manhart and that other courts considering contentions similar to
petrs' have agreed with CA9.
Four amici briefs were also received.

The American Council of

Life Insurance makes it clear why the insurance industry feels that
this decision will have a tremendous impact on the insurance business.
The Council claims that Manhart had little (or no) effect on the
industry because it involved an unpopular fringe benefit (employeroperated annuities).

By finding Title VII liability when an employer

goes out and buys annuities for its employees, this case addresses a
popular fringe benefit that affects 99% of the pension industry.
Moreover, insurance companies cannot by most states' laws
discriminatorily offer only to employers annuities calculated on
unisex tables.

But if they offered both options to everyone, the

insurance companies would soon be insolvent because women would choose
to buy unisex annuities, which give them higher monthly payments for a
lower price, while men would choose annuities based on men-only
mortality tables since that would maximize their benefits.

Without

men signing up for unisex insurance, that option would be unstable
because there would be no men paying in more and receiving less to
subsidize the women who receive more.

To make a long argument short,

this decision will require all insurance companies to use ONLY unisex
tables, which is a result Manhart claimed it was not mandating.
The Academy of Actuaries agrees with the above reasoning.

It

notes that it is possible that Congress intended this result when it
enacted Title VII, but thinks that since the result was not foreseen
by the Manhart Court, cert should be granted to reconsider the Manhart

decision before lower courts blithely require the entire industry to
change its methods of operation.

6 -

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners argues that
lower courts' extention of Manhart has le~d to the federalization of
the insurance industry, which is a reversal of the long-standing
practice of reserving its regulation to the states.

The Court should

grant cert in order to decide whether this result is desirable.
The State of California and its Teachers' Retirement Association
has filed a brief because it is involved in another case where it is
making the same arguments rejected by CA9 in this case.
DISCUSSION:

The Conference should consider this case with Calif.

v. Retired Public Employees' Ass'n, No. 82-262, also on this list.
Both cases demonstrate the problems encountered in applying Manhart.
While none of the parties point to conflicts among the circuits, the
Court may want to examine the insurance industry's claims about the
dire results of the many decisions in this area.

If cert is granted,

it should be limited to the question whether Manhart applies to
employers who purchase insurance from independent companies and
perhaps to the question whether there is a defense in the fact that
~ the marketplace did not offer nondiscriminatory choices.2

The intent

question is well settled (discriminatory impact is all that is
required).

The contentions based on the voluntary nature of the plan

and the existence of nondiscriminatory options are simply variations
on the familiar "separate but equal" argument.

The Tenth Amendment

issue borders on frivolous.
There is a response and four amicus briefs.
September 20, 1982

2

Dreyfuss

Op'ns in pet'n

assume that the stipulations are in the record, and that the
Court would request the parties to reproduce them in order to
resolve the factual dispute referred to in note 1.
I

